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Abstract
We develop a target zone model with realistic features such as finite exit time, non-
stationary dynamics and heavy tails. Our rigorous characterization of risk corresponds to the
dynamic counterpart of a mean-preserving spread. We explicitly solve for both stationary
and transient exchange rate paths, and show how they are influenced by the distance to
both the time horizon and the target zone bands. This enables us to show how central
bank intervention is endogenous to both the distance of the fundamental to the band and
the underlying risk. We discuss how the credibility of the target zone is shaped by the set
horizon and the degree of underlying risk, and we determine a minimum time at which the
required parity can be reached. We prove that the interplay of the diffusive component
and the destabilizing risk component can yield an endogenous regime shift characterized
by a threshold level of risk above which the target zone ceases to exist. All the previous
results cannot obtain by means of the standard Gaussian and affine models. We recover by
numerical simulations the different exchange rate densities established by the target zone
literature.
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1 Introduction
The exchange rate target zone literature pioneered by Krugman (1991) is based on a stochastic
flexible price monetary model in continuous time. This literature highlights the role of market
expectations of fundamentals in shaping exchange rate movements. Given its assumptions of
perfect credibility, it implies that central bankers need only intervene marginally at the bounds of
the target zone or allow honeymoon effects of credibility to automatically stabilize the exchange
rate. The European Monetary System (EMS) and the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which
have existed from 1979 to 1999 until countries adopted the Euro, have provided a natural test
bed for this theory.
The target zone model is both well accepted theoretically and has provided the intellectual
justification for a nominal anchor for monetary policy. However, there is scant empirical support
for the validity of the framework. The U-shaped distribution within the target band and the
negative correlation between the exchange rate and the interest rate differential implied by the
Krugman model have found little counterpart in the data. In spite of this, the practice of using
target zones continued through the 2000’s with new member states joining the ERM-II target
band and slowly adopting the Euro.1 For example, Denmark is still in ERM-II with a ±2.5%
band with the EUR. It is conceivable that future new member states will go through the ERM
process, making target zone modeling of current relevance. Our purpose in this paper is to
unpack target zone credibility, while incorporating non-stationary dynamics and heavy tails.
We make three main contributions. First, we model the fundamental dynamics of the exchange
rate using the definition of risk which corresponds to Rothschild and Stiglitz’s concept of mean-
preserving increase in risk. As is well known, risk and variance are not necessarily equivalent, as
is commonly assumed in the existing literature. Second, we explicitly consider non-stationary
dynamics for a currency to exit a target zone, and show how the credibility of the latter is shaped
both by the finite time horizon and the degree of underlying risk. Solving for explicitly time-
dependent dynamics also allows us to show how the exchange rate is continuously determined
by the distance to the time horizon as well as its distance to the target bands. It turns out that
the underlying dynamics are similar to the phenomena famously described by Kac (1966), where
he asked whether one could “hear the shape of a drum”. In the case of exchange rates, in certain
situations this can indeed happen, especially when the exchange rate is pushed to the sides of
the target band by an additional external force: intuitively, this corresponds to the acoustic
difference between striking a tense membrane versus a loose one. This is what we describe in
our paper. This allows us to show how the central bank determines its intervention strategies
by the degree to which it “feels” the presence of the target zone bounds, and depends critically
on the degree of underlying risk and the band size. Third, moving to a theoretically correct
definition of risk allows for the emergence of a regime shift once risk reaches a critical threshold,
after which the target zone cannot be credibly held.
The standard case of exchange rate dynamics in a finite target zone with Gaussian-driven funda-
mentals is a simplified, limiting case of our model for which risk and variance are the same, and
which fails to provide a palatable explanation for well-known exits such as ERM-I. Correctly
specifying risk implies dynamics in which the exchange rate fundamental has a tendency to sys-
tematically escape its purely diffusive nature and move away from its expected value. As such,
risk can be a destabilizing force which runs counter to the best efforts of a central bank trying
to maintain a target zone. This may cause persistent and potentially one-sided deviations from
central parity. Moreover, we show that the effect of risk is both nonlinear and discontinuous. For
low risk, our dynamics are similar to the standard model. As risk increases, the exchange rate
1Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Malta, Slovakia, Estonia. The ERM target zone bands in ERM-II is 6.5
times the band size of ERM-I.
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process is increasingly destabilized and requires a monotonically increasing minimum time for
the target zone to be reached. However, once a critical threshold of risk is crossed, we observe
a regime shift in which the minimum time suddenly drops down and the target zone effectively
ceases to exist. The intuition behind this result is that the destabilizing portion of the process
generated by risk has overwhelmed the diffusive part. This ties directly to the characterization
of credibility of a target zone. Credibility corresponds to the central bank being able to reach
the set central parity with the agreed bands at the chosen time horizon. Our model shows that
considering non-stationary dynamics is paramount in determining whether the chosen horizon
is feasible: we characterize the minimum required time necessary for the parity to be reached.
Any smaller time horizon chosen by the central bank would not be credible. In contrast, existing
models models assume away the problem by positing perfect credibility and stationary dynamics.
We then show how the model can fit a wide set of scenarios regarding credibility and control,
and we recover by Monte Carlo simulations the different exchange rate densities presented by
the established target zone literature.
2 Existing literature and motivations
The seminal paper by Krugman (1991) hinges on the assumption of perfect credibility of the
target zone, which gives rise to a U-shaped distribution of the exchange rate. This implies that
the exchange rate spends most of its time near the bands of the zone, as well as a negative
relationship between the interest rate differential and exchange rate volatility. Given this “hon-
eymoon effect”, the central bank only has to intervene marginally at the bands. The only source
of risk in this model is the volatility of the Gaussian distribution. The theoretical predictions of
the model have been shown not to hold empirically by Mathieson et al. (1991), Meese and Rose
(1991) and Svensson (1991). This led to the development of so-called second-generation models,
which relax Krugman’s assumptions across two dimensions, to allow for imperfect credibility of
the target zone and for intramarginal intervention. The first dimension is studied by Bertola and
Caballero (1992) and Bertola and Svensson (1993), who relax the notion of credibility and allow
for time varying credibility or realignment risk. They show that honeymoon effects disappear
when there is a high probability of exchange rate revaluation. Furthermore, Tristani (1994) and
Werner (1995) study endogenous realignment risk, as well as including mean-reverting funda-
mental dynamics.
Allowing for the possibility of realignment is a way of characterizing a riskier fundamental
process, motivated by speculative attacks and constant realignment of the ERM currencies.
This is achieved by using a diffusion process with jumps, as an ad-hoc way of thickening the
tails of the distribution in order to better fit the data. The second dimension explored by second-
generation models focuses on allowing the fundamental process to be controlled intramarginally,
thus generating a hump-shaped distribution where the exchange rate spends most of its time
around central parity. Dumas and Delgado (1992) and Bessec (2003), using controlled diffusion
processes, show that the honeymoon effects are considerably weakened, putting into question
the necessity of a target zone when central banks intervene intramarginally. Bekaert and Gray
(1998) and Lundbergh and Teräsvirta (2006) test the implications of the second-generation
models, and find mixed evidence with a slight tendency towards the intramarginal interventions
hypothesis. Ajevskis (2011) extended the basic target zone model to a finite termination time
setting while maintaining the assumptions of the original model: it is the closest to our approach.
Ajevskis (2015) extends his earlier contribution by considering the exchange rate to follow a
mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process and compares the difference in exchange rate-
fundamental-target zone dynamics between the OU process and a Brownian motion. He solves
the stationary problem for the OU process but he is unable to explicitly solve the non-stationary
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part of the process.2 Recently, Studer-Suter and Janssen (2017) and Lera and Sornette (2016,
2018 and 2019) find empirical evidence for the target zone model for the EUR/CHF floor target
zone set by the Swiss National Bank between 2011 and 2015, the latter mapping the Krugman
model to the option chain.
In particular, Lera and Sornette (2015) shows how the standard Krugman model can hold in
specific cases, such as the EUR/CHF target zone, because of a sustained pressure that con-
tinuously pushes the exchange rate closer to the bounds of the target zone, which the central
bank tries to counteract. In this particular case, the sustained pressure stemmed from the Swiss
Franc being used as a safe asset in the middle of the European crisis. This implies that there is a
source of additional risk which is radically different from the diffusive nature of Gaussian noise.
This risk destabilises the exchange rate fundamentals and creates an extra tendency to escape
from its mean and move towards the boundary. Rey (2015) famously argued that the global
financial cycles stemming from the United States generates additional risk for central banks
targeting a nominal anchor. Additionally, Gopinath and Stein (2019) and Kalemli-Özcan (2019)
show how US monetary policy shocks can affect the exchange rate of a country with minimal
USD exposure because of the dominant nature of the USD as a trade currency. All of these
examples represent possible sources of external risk that need to be included in the modeling of
the fundamental process. All pre-existing attempts at modeling fundamental risk involve either
the variance of Gaussian noise or the addition of ad-hoc jumps.
That risk and variance do not necessarily coincide is often forgotten in applied economic re-
search.3
Specific dynamics or phenomena cannot be represented by conflating all available information
on risk solely on the variance parameter of the Gaussian distribution. We therefore adopt a
definition of risk which corresponds to the concept of a mean-preserving increase in risk, in
the form of second-order stochastic dominance, often referred to as a mean-preserving spread.
This concept has been introduced in a static setting by the fundamental works of Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970 and 1971), who define two sufficient integral conditions that allow one to
unambiguously rank distributions in terms of their riskiness. This concept has been extended to
a dynamic setting by Arcand et al. (2019): the authors prove that, among diffusion processes,
the only process with nonlinear drift and a Brownian bridge satisfying the dynamic equivalent of
the two integral conditions is the Dynamic Mean-Preserving Spread process (DMPS), which is
a non-Gaussian process with a hyperbolic function as drift. The parameter that modulates the
nonlinear drift determines the risk of the process, as well as controlling the weight of the tails of its
distribution. This process allows one to rigorously characterize the risk of a stochastic process
while both escaping the Gaussian straightjacket, allowing for heavier tails, and maintaining
analytical tractability. This also allows us to precisely characterize the interplay of diffusive and
2We provide the full solution of the mean-reverting OU case in Appendix C, as a further contribution of this
paper.
3As a descriptive example, consider two lotteries x1 and x2, each given by:
x1 = [(0.01, 0.10); (0.10, 0.00); (1, 0.70); (10, 0.00); (100, 0.20); (1090, 0.00)],
x2 = [(0.01, 0.00); (0.10, 0.01); (1, 0.00); (10, 0.98); (100, 0.00); (1090, 0.01)],
where each pair (xij , pij) corresponds to the probability pij of the realization xij , for lottery j = 1, 2 and states of
nature i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Notice that the expected values of the two lotteries are the same: Ex1 = Ex2 = 20.701.
However, V ar x1 = 2, 000.7 < 11, 979 = V ar x2. Despite the variance of x2 being much larger than the variance of
x1, an agent with logarithmic utility will strictly prefer x2 over x1 because E log x1 = 0.46 < 2.303 = E log x2. The
two lotteries cannot unambiguously be ranked in terms of their risk, while they can be in terms of their variance.
This simple example illustrates the reason why we want to introduce in our model a rigorous characterization of
risk.
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ballistic forces4: the tendency of external risk to push the exchange rate towards the bounds of
the zone is counteracted by the central bank’s efforts to maintain the fundamental fluctuating
around its mean. This is precisely what is argued by Lera and Sornette (2015). The standard
Gaussian case is a limiting case for which the risk parameter is zero. This is a more realistic
characterization of fundamental risk, especially considering the influx of external risk given by
global financial cycles. We show how the solution of the model consists in the sum of two
equations. The first is the time-independent stationary part, which corresponds to the behavior
of the exchange rate at the time of entry in the target zone, and the second is the transient part,
which describes the sensitivity of the exchange rate to the distance to the bands, as a function
of risk, band size and time to exit.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 3 we extend the traditional stationary framework
in order to include non-stationary dynamics, modeling the risk of the fundamental process by
means of dynamic mean-preserving spreads. Section 4 discusses the connection between risk,
target zone width and credibility. In Section 5 we show the emergence of regime shifts once
a critical threshold of risk is reached. Section 6 explains the numerical methods employed in
the model simulations, and presents the results. Section 7 discusses possible interpretations and
sources of external risk, while section 8 concludes and discusses an agenda for future research.
3 Target zone exit with a finite time horizon
Our starting point is the exchange rate equation given by:
Xt = r ft +
(1− r)
α
E
{
dXt
dt
}
, r ∈ [0, 1], (1)
where ft describes the dynamics of the logarithm of a fundamental, the stochastic process dWt
is the standard White Gaussian Noise (WGN), Xt stands for the logarithm of the exchange rate
at time t and E {dXt} describes a forward-looking estimation of the logarithm of the exchange
rate. The parameter α > 0 with the dimension of a frequency (i.e. 1/[time unit]) modulates the
size of the forward-looking time window. The ratio r ∈ [0, 1] weights the relative importance
attributed to the present fundamental position versus its forecasted estimate.
As stated before, we want to model the risk of the fundamental in order to include a more
rigorous characterization of risk, allowing for non-Gaussianity and heavier tails, yet allowing
analytical tractability. We choose as a process for f(t) the dynamic mean-preserving spread
(DMPS) process, defined as
dft = λ tanh(λft)dt+ dWt, ft=0 = f0, (2)
where the nonlinear drift λ tanh(λft), λ ∈ R+ generates a probability spread (an increase in risk)
around the mean of the fundamental. The process (2) is a non-Gaussian process that allows to
modulate the risk of the fundamental by means of the parameter λ and control the weight of
the tails of its distribution5. We can allow for a rescaling of the log-fundamental process by a
sensitivity parameter σ < 1, and equation (2) can easily be written as
4By ballistic forces we mean a drift component leading to a variance that is increasing quadratically in time
5We note yet again that an increase in risk via a DMPS noise source is not the same as just an increase in
variance: a situation where the fundamental is driven simply by Gaussian fluctuations around a mean is discussed
in detail in Appendix C.
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dft = β tanh(βft)dt+ σdWt, (3)
where β = λσ is the rescaled risk parameter. We allow explicitly time-dependent dynamics
Xt = X(t, ft), and therefore study non-stationary behavior. For f0 = 0, the fundamental
dynamics do not affect the systematic vanishing average of ft, but the repulsive drift β tanh(βf)
introduces an extra tendency (risk) to escape from f = 0. The analysis of the case of mean-
reverting fundamentals is presented in Appendices D and E, where we fully solve both Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck (O-U) and non-Gaussian, softly attractive dynamics. The latter can be of interest
for researchers as an alternative to the O-U process, since it allows to escape Gaussianity and to
model an ergodic process with light attraction towards its long-run level, whilst remaining fully
analytically tractable.
Using Itô calculus, Eq.(1) rewrites as :
∂tX(t, f) +
σ2
2
∂ffX(t, f) + β tanh(βf)∂fX(t, f)− α
(1− r)X(t, f) = −
rα
(1− r)f. (4)
Note the presence of the additional term ∂tX(f) in Eq.(4) which does not appear when one
focuses only on stationary situations. The solution of (4) can be written as the sum of the
time-independent stationary solution and the transient solution, i.e.
X(τ, f) = X∗(τ, f) +XS(f). (5)
Appendix A shows how the stationary solution of (5) is given by
XS(f) =
1
cosh(βf)
{AY1(f) +BY2(f) + YP (f)} , (6)
where we have 
Y1(f) = exp
{
+
√[
β2 + 2α
(1−r)σ2
]
f
}
,
Y2(f) = exp
{
−
√[
β2 + 2α
(1−r)σ2
]
f
}
,
YP (f) =
2αr(f(2α+β2(1−r)(1−σ2)) cosh(βf)+2(1−r)βσ2 sinh(βf))
(2α+β2(1−r)(1−σ2))2
(7)
In Eqs. (6) and (7) the couple of constants A and B can be determined by smooth fitting at the
bounds f = −f ,6:
∂fXS(f) |f=f = ∂fXS(f) |f=f = 0. (8)
The two constants of integration A and B can be obtained in closed form but their expression
is lengthy and therefore omitted. An illustration of the stationary solution (6) is presented in
Figure 1, which also shows how an increase in the riskiness β of the fundamental prompts the
(stationary) exchange rate to behave more independently of the dynamics of the fundamental.
At high levels of β, the exchange rate dynamics are driven mostly by the risk and depend less
6For simplicity we focus our attention to targets zones symmetric with respect to f = 0, although the results
hold for general bounds.
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on fundamentals, especially around the bounds, as represented by the steepening of the central
slope. In this figure, f = 10% and we assume a quasi-daily time step for the expectation
dt = 1/200 with r = 0.5 which implies an equal weight on the fundamental position versus its
forecasted estimate. These are important assumptions for our setup. We know that fundamental
macroeconomic forecasts do poorly at forecasting the exchange rate at horizons over one year.
The violation of uncovered interest parity is a well established fact. This could be because
of an exchange rate premium (country/liquidity risk) or due to expectations being biased in
finite samples. Evans and Lyons (2002) and Evans (2010) use a portfolio shift model to account
for market microstructure pressures by adding order flows as a predictor and they find that
it improves the predictability of the exchange rate. This model is useful at higher frequencies
where there is an immediate impact on order flow pressures on prices. They argue that order
flow reveals advance information about future fundamentals or private information about risk
premia. Chinn and Moore (2011) and Ferreira et al. (2019) also make the case that expectation
errors of exchange rate using fundamentals are systematic and they show that a hybrid approach
of using order flows as a proxy for these expectation errors significantly improves the exchange
rate predictions. We believe our parametrization of dt = 1/200 with r = 0.5 corresponds to a
case of fast agent updating with equal weight on fundamentals is similar to the case of Ferreira
et al. (2019) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015). Changing the dt to a more fundamental
updating frequency, dt = 1/12 for example, will reduce the sensitivity of the exchange rate to
the fundamentals. Moreover, changing the r > 0.5 will increase the sensitivity of the exchange
rate to fundamental process.
Figure 1 Effect of varying β on exchange rate dynamics
We now turn to the transient dynamics. At a given time horizon t = T , we fix the predetermined
exchange rateX(T, f) = 0. In terms of the backward time τ = T−t, we write the transformation
X∗(τ, f) = Y ∗(τ, f)/ cosh(βf). The time-dependent partial differential equation we need to solve
is therefore given by
∂τY
∗(τ, f)− σ
2
2
∂ffY
∗(τ, f) +
[
β2
2
+
α
(1− r)
]
Y ∗(τ, f) = 0. (9)
with boundary conditions given by
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
[
∂fY
∗(τ, f)− β tanh(βf)Y ∗(τ, f)]
f=f
= 0,
[
∂fY
∗(τ, f)− β tanh(βf)Y ∗(τ, f)]
f=f
= 0.
(10)
We express the solution Y (τ, f) as Y ∗(τ, f) = φ(τ)ψ(f), and proceed to solve this equation
by separation of variables and expansion over the basis of a complete set of orthogonal eigen-
functions. Sturm-Liouville theory allows us to state that on the interval [−f,+f ], one has a
complete set of orthogonal eigenfunctions ψk(f) satisfying Eq.(8), namely:
ψk(f) = sin
(√
2Ωk
σ
f
)
∈ [f, f ], k = N+, (11)
where each eigenvalue Ωk solves the transcendental equation
√
2Ωk
σ
cot
(√
2Ωk
σ
f
)
= β tanh(βf).
Figure 2 Target band and spectrum
Graphical illustration of the solution of equation (3), showing the effect of varying f¯ on the spectrum Ωk.
(a) f¯ = 10% (b) f¯ = 20%
Furthermore, the eigenvalues are real and span a discrete spectrum:
{Ωk} :=
{
Ωk(β, f)
}
, k ∈ N+.
and can therefore be ordered as
Ω1(β, f) < Ω2(β, f) < · · · .
For any k ∈ N+, the corresponding Ωk(β, f) solves the transcendental equation (3), and has
to be calculated numerically. For a general β > 0, one observes that the successive eigenvalues
are not evenly spaced with a distance decreasing with k. The spectrum is controlled by the
width of the target zone f¯ : the wider is the band, the smaller the separation. The spectrum
and its relationship with the target band size are illustrated in Figure 5. Observe also that in
the limit β = 0, one straightforwardly verifies that from Eq.(11) one obtains the evenly spaced
set Ωk(0, f) = (2k + 1) pi2f .
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Figure 3 Transient dynamics
Note: This figure shows the evolution of X(T − t, f) of the transient dynamics in the target zone. In Panel (A), we assume
a target zone which has been set T = 3 years, with β = 1 for a given set of fundamentals. For the sake of brevity we
truncate the figure towards the end of the target zone to effectively illustrate the transient dynamics. In Panel (B) we
illustrate the difference in transient dynamics for different β values. Here we have assumed a target band symmetric around
zero, i.e. f¯ = 10% = −f . We also assume r = 0.5, α = 20. We truncate the eigenfunction expansion at 50. The second
panel illustrates the change in dynamics from β = 0 (Gaussian) to β = 5.
(A)
(B)
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The development of the transient solution X∗(τ, f) over the complete set {ψk(f)} enables one
to finally write the full expansion in the following way:
X∗(τ, f) = X∗(T − t, f), t ∈ [0, T ]
=
1
cosh(βf)
∞∑
k=1
ck exp
[−(Ω2k + ρ)(T − t)] sin
[√
2Ωk
σ
f
]
(12)
ck = − 1
f
∫ +f
−f
XS(f) sin
[√
2Ωk
σ
f
]
df
ρ =
[
β2
2
+
α
(1− r)
]
.
The full derivation is reported in Appendix A. When t = T , from Eq.(13), by construction of the
Fourier coefficients ck, we have X∗(0, f) = −XS(f) and so X(T, f) = X∗(0, f)+XS(f) = 0 thus
reaching the required fixed parity. An illustration of the transient exchange rate dynamics, as
well as the overall transition dynamics throughout the time interval [0, T ], is presented in Figure
3. This solution allows to express the movements of the exchange rate via a weighted sum of its
stationary behavior, its distance to the exit time and the distance between its value at any time t
and the target band. The eigenvalues modulate the frequency of both fundamental and exchange
rate movements within the band. The Fourier coefficients ck represent the impact of the size
of the target band in the overall dynamics, via their weight on the infinite series of frequency
components (the “harmonics” of the exchange rate path). Loosely speaking, this formulation of
the solution allows one to describe the sensitivity of the exchange rate to the distance to the
target band. Once the eigenvalues and the eigenfunctions are known, as famously asked by Kac
(1966), “if one had perfect pitch”, one would be able to “hear” the shape of the target zone7.
This formulation of the solution allows us to uncover the unique nature of the smooth-pasting
conditions: the exchange rate process is not reflected at the bounds in the probabilistic sense,
since this would have been modeled as a zero derivative condition on the transition probability
density function. We are in the presence of “soft” boundaries, where the central bank interven-
tions are determined by the interplay of the distance of the exchange rate to the bounds as well
as the tendency of the fundamental to hit them (the risk): this is what is implied by the eigen-
function expansion of the solution. This allows us to “endogenize” the bands: because of the
presence of expectations in the exchange rate equation (4), we have a second-order term which
allows us to solve the equation in its Sturm-Liouville form and eigenfunction expansion. The
Fourier coefficients modulate the sensitivity of the exchange rate to the distance to the band,
allowing for the central bank to intervene whenever the fundamental is “felt” to be approaching
the bounds. This “feeling” is in fact a direct translation of how much the fundamental tends
to escape and how much the central bank needs to intervene marginally or intramarginally:
this is a direct consequence of the presence of expectations in the exchange rate equation. In
other words, the higher the tendency to hit the bounds and the greater is the likelihood that
the central bank will actually intervene intramarginally, with increasingly less regard towards
the actual position of the fundamental within the band. One can therefore see that the higher
is the risk (the fundamental’s tendency to escape from its central position), the more will the
7Note that the time-independent part of the problem is a one-dimensional Neumann problem on the boundary
∂D = [f, f ] {
∆f + Ωf = 0
∇f |∂D = 0,
which is exactly the problem of finding the overtones on a vibrating surface.
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central bank intervene intramarginally. The same applies when the target band shrinks. The
standard Krugman framework applies when the fundamental is a pure Brownian motion and the
central bank only intervenes marginally. Note that this phenomenon is directly a consequence
of our rigorous characterization of fundamental risk. In Section 6 we show how the model can
replicate the different exchange rate densities under different assumptions of credibility and in-
tervention8. We also point out that this framework potentially allows for the existence of de
jure and de facto bands, as noted by Lundbergh and Teräsvirta (2006): if the de jure band is
large, expectations over the magnitude of risk may react to a narrower de facto band. This is a
phenomenon commonly observed in most ERM countries.
4 Risk, target width and credibility: the role of the spectral gap
Here we discuss the interplay between the risk parameter β, the size of the target band [−f,+f ]
and the credibility of the time horizon T at which to reach the target zone. We first note
that at the initial time t = 0, from Eq.(13) we have X∗(T, f) ≈ 0 and therefore X(0, f) =
X∗(T, f) +XS(f) ≈ XS(f). Since Ω1(β, f) < Ω2(β, f) < · · · , one can approximately write:
X(T, f) ' XS(f) +O
(
e−(Ω21+ρ)T
)
.
While for the exact solution we should have X(T, f) = XS(f), one sees immediately that
X(T − t, f) = XS(f) + X∗(T − t, f) with X∗(T − t, f) given by Eq.(13) nearly matches the
exact solution provided we have an horizon interval T & trelax where trelax :=
(
Ω21 + ρ
)−1 is the
characteristic relaxation time of the exchange rate process. This provides therefore a validity
range for the transient dynamics given by the expansion Eq.(13).
Hence, at time t = 0, the required initial probability XS(f) law is reached only for a large enough
time horizon T & trelax. This now enables us to link the transient dynamics of X∗(t, f) to the
credibility of the target zone: the relaxation time τrelax determines the minimum time interval
for which a credible target zone may be maintained. The larger β (the risk of the fundamental),
the greater is the tendency of the fundamental to escape from its mean; the authorities need
therefore to maintain the target zone for a longer minimum duration. An increase in risk, for a
given f¯ , implies that the target zone would have to be set for a longer horizon T to be credible.
Alternatively, for a given risk β, an increase of the target zone width f , requires a longer minimal
T implementation to ensure the overall credibility of the policy. In other words, the central bank
has to impose that the time horizon T is at least as large as the relaxation time trelax.
An intuitive interpretation of the relaxation time in this framework is to understand trelax as the
characteristic elapsed time required to “feel” the first effects of the home central bank’s actions
aimed at reducing fluctuations of the exchange rate, compared to a free float. The bank’s actions
may be then viewed as a de facto reduction of the target zone band over time, whilst the de jure
band remains unchanged. A possible implication would be that trelax would be the minimum
time for agents for update their priors accurately, generating self-fulfilling expectations that
create the honeymoon effect.
The inverse of the relaxation time is determined by the spectral gap, which is the distance
between 0 and the smallest eigenvalue. We therefore have the relationship (trelax)−1 = (Ω21 + ρ).
The spectral gap controls the asymptotic time behaviour of the expansion given by (13), and it
is continuously dependent on risk β and band f¯ . This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.
8For additional information, see Figure 2 in Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2005)
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Figure 4 Interaction between β and f
Note: This figure shows the interaction of varying risk (β) and varying the band size (f). An increase in risk, for a given
f , implies that the lowest eigenvalue Ω1 falls (Panel (A)). The inverse of this value controls the trelax.
Let us now study analytically the behaviour of the solution Ω1 of the transcendent Eq.(3).
Writing z =
√
2Ω1f , Eq.(3) implies that the product βf is the determinant of the amplitude
of Ω1. An elementary graphic analysis enables to conclude that two limiting situations can be
reached:

βf << 1 ⇒ z . pi2 ⇒ Ω1 . pi2f ⇒ t
−1
relax .
[
pi
2f
]2
+ β
2
2 +
α
(1−r) ,
βf >> 1 ⇒ z & pi ⇒ Ω1 & pif ⇒ t
−1
relax &
[
pi
f
]2
+ β
2
2 +
α
(1−r) .
and therefore:
1[
pi
f
]2
+ β
2
2 +
α
(1−r)
≤ trelax ≤ 1[
pi
2f
]2
+ β
2
2 +
α
(1−r)
. (13)
Eq.(13) together with Figure 4, exhibits how an increase in risk β affects trelax more strongly
when the exchange rate is allowed to float in a wider band width f¯ .
5 Risk, target band and regime shifts
An unique phenomenon that emerges when considering repulsive drifts, and in particular our
specification, is the emergence of a regime shift. Figure 5(b) shows that for a large enough
target band, after a threshold level in β, the relaxation time suddenly jumps to a much lower
value and remains almost constant (though very slowly increasing) for further increases in risk.
This effect happens because when the tendency β of the noise source driving the fundamental
reaches and surpasses a certain level, the ballistic component in the noise source overcomes the
diffusion. The force β tanh(βf) in the mean-preserving spread becomes the main driver of the
stochastic process driving the fundamental, and therefore ft becomes a ballistic-driven process
with a tendency to escape from its mean that is stronger than the tendency to diffuse around
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Figure 5 Risk, target band and regime shifts
Regime shift and eigenvalue jump as a function of risk, for different target bands
(a) f¯ = 2% (b) f¯ = 15%
its central value. While this may look like a sudden emergence of supercredibility, this is in
fact the opposite: the target zone de facto ceases to exist, since the bounds cannot be felt even
in an infinitesimal time interval dt. The ballistic tendency of the fundamental to escape its
initial position causes the band to be hit and even surpassed at every time step, and smooth-
pasting conditions cannot be applied anymore. This has a direct implication for honeymoon
effects: Appendix B shows how after a threshold level of risk the smooth fitting procedure at
the boundaries cannot be applied, and hence honeymoon effects become unobtainable. Since
the exchange rate has become primarily ballistic-driven (we remind that ballistic means with
variance increasing quadratically in time), this implies that very large risk denies central banks
the monetary autonomy until the moment of entering the currency zone. This phenomenon is
illustrated in Figure 6.
Consider now the smooth-pasting conditions (10): one can separate the contribution of the
eigenfunction to the one given by the probability spread and obtain
∂f sin
(√
2Ωk
σ ft
)
sin
(√
2Ωk
σ ft
) − β tanh(βft) = 0
m
∂fEIG(Ωk, ft)
EIG(Ωk, ft)
− MPS(β, ft) = 0. (14)
The first term is a total sensitivity term, closely related to the elasticity of the eigenfunction with
respect to the fundamental, and it represents the overall variation of the exchange rate with the
fundamental. The second term represents the increase in risk, as well as the ballistic component
that represents the tendency of the fundamental to hit the target bands. The solution of this
equation yields the spectrum {Ωk}, for k = N+. The difference of the two terms represents the
residual tendency of the home country fundamental to avoid converging to the target fundamen-
tal. The spectral gap, therefore, represents the intensity of the probability spread. The regime
shift will happen at a threshold value βe, only obtainable numerically, for which the spectral
gap will suddenly jump upwards: the ballistic repulsive force has dominated over the diffusive
part and the first eigenvalue jumps higher. The oscillating part of the expansion increases in
frequency, and the time-dependent exponential decay increases in speed. A graphical illustration
is shown in Figure 7: one can easily show that the lower bound for the threshold βe is given by
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1/f¯ . This allows to uncover the close relationship between the regime shift and the size of the
target band. This regime shift can not occur with any Gaussian process, as well as with any
mean-reverting dynamics.
Figure 6 Risk threshold, distance to the bands and honeymoon effects
Ballistic-driven vs. diffusion-driven regimes
(a) β > βe. No honeymoon effects (b) β < βe.
In the diffusion-driven regime (characterised by a relatively low β < 1/f), one observes that
an increase of the risk implies a decrease in the sensitivity, since trelax is increasing. This may
seem counterintuitive: but it must be remembered that at time t = 0, the initial condition is
the stationary solution of the central bank-controlled diffusion for the given risk. Increasing
β, therefore, is likely to load the stationary probability mass accumulated in the vicinity of on
the zone boundaries. Escape from this stationary state by bank action becomes somehow more
difficult, ultimately leading to an increase of trelax. Conversely, in high risks regimes β > 1/f
where the ballistic dynamics dominate, the boundaries of the target zone are systematically hit by
the fundamental. In this situation, the central bank will intervene almost entirely intramarginally
regardless of whether the fundamental is actually close to the bands, since honeymoon effects
cannot exist anymore. This allows in Eq.(12) for a sudden reduction of the the probability mass
located on the bounds, and this generates the sharp drop of trelax. In other words, the band
implicitly ceases to exist and the central bank operates effectively in an infinitesimally narrow
band. This opens a different angle on understanding target zone credibility: if risk is too high,
exchange rate expectations are no longer anchored to the band and the effectiveness of central
bank intervention is greatly damped. What the central bank could do is therefore either reduce
risk, which in practice is often infeasible, or increase the size of the target zone which itself is
bounded by the free-float exchange rate volatility. The new size of the band would have to be
large enough for this new target zone to be “heard”.
6 Numerical simulations
We simulate central bank intervention by means of a symmetrized Euler scheme for stochastic
differential equations. Since the original problem is an one-dimensional Neumann problem on
the boundary ∂D = [−f¯ , f¯ ], the regulated SDE can be written as
ft =
∫ t
0
b(fs)ds+ σ
∫ t
0
dWs +
∫ t
0
γ(fs)ds,
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Figure 7 Risk and eigenvalue jump
Note: Regime change For β = 15, the repulsive force β tanh(βf) (black curve) overcomes the diffusion component and
generates the first eigenvalue jump. For β = 6 (red curve), the regime has not yet shifted. Here f¯ = 0.1, σ = 1, α =
200, r = 0.5.
where b(fs) is the nonlinear drift and γ(.) is the oblique reflection of the process on the boundary
∂D. This is the equivalent of the interventions, and we assume that for the unit vector field γ
there exists a constant c so that γ(x) ·~n(x) ≥ c for all points x on the boundary D. This can be
interpreted as assuming bounded interventions. We use a regular mesh [0, T ] for the numerical
simulation, for which the weak error is of order 0.5 when the reflection is normal (i.e. γ = ~n),
which is our case. We choose this method in order to obtain consistent Monte Carlo simulation
of the resulting densities. The algorithm starts with f0 = 0 and for any time ti for which fti ∈ D
we have for t ∈ ∆t = ti+1 − ti that
FN,it = f
N
ti + bˆ(f
N
ti )(t− ti) + σ(Wt −Wti)
as in the standard Euler-Maruyama scheme, and the nonlinear drift b(.) is approximated with a
second-order stochastic Runge-Kutta method. If FN,it+1 /∈ ∂D, then we set
fNt+1 = pi
γ
∂D(F
N,i
t+1)− γ(FN,it+1),
where pi∂D(x) is the projection of x on the boundary ∂D parallel to the intervention γ. If
FN,it+1 ∈ ∂D, then obviously fNt+1 = FN,it+1. For more references we refer to Bossy et al. (2004).
The exchange rate path is then obtained simply by setting XNt = X∗(fNt , T − t) for every
t ∈ [0, T ]. It’s of fundamental importance to set ∆t equal to the update ratio given by 1/α in
our model, so the increment of the simulated exchange rate path has the same updating time
frequency as the central bank. We can now discuss two kinds of intervention: the kind that
intervenes by reflecting the process just so it stays within the band (sometimes called “leaning
against the wind”), and the pure reflection one, which projects the fundamental process by an
amount equivalent to how much the process would have surpassed the boundary. This distinction
can be understood also as the amount of how much reserves the central bank has at its disposal
in order to stabilize the fundamental process: the greater this amount, the more likely it is
that the intervention will be a pure reflection one. We also assume that intervention is effective
instantaneously. This distinction has also important implications in the resulting exchange rate
density: as shown in Figure 6, given our rigorous characterization of risk, the greater the β and
the earlier will the central bank have to intervene, given the fundamental’s increased tendency
to escape towards the bands. We present five possible scenarios by estimating Monte Carlo
densities of the simulated exchange rate process: the first two correspond to the Gaussian case,
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where β = 0 with each of the two intervention strategies. The densities are obtained by Monte
Carlo simulation of N sample paths, binning the data and limiting the bin size to zero to obtain
the convolution density, then averaging over the N realizations and interpolating the resulting
points. For all figures N is set to 5000, σ = 0.1, r = 0.5, α = 200, T = 3, exchange rate target
band ±10%. For more references on the method we refer to Asmussen and Glynn (2007). We
obtain a realization path for each of the two and obtain both U-shaped (corresponding to the base
Krugman case) and hump-shaped densities, corresponding to the Dumas and Delgado (1992)
framework. The realized densities are shown in Figure 8. We then simulate the case in which
β > 0 but not large enough to trigger the regime shift, each one with a different intervention
strategy: in the marginal intervention case we obtain the two-regime density (β = 5), as in the
Bessec (2003) framework, and in the intramarginal one we obtain a hump-shaped distribution
as for all intramarginal intervention frameworks. These results are shown in Figure 9. We now
note that this is a consequence of our characterization of risk: the tendency β of the fundamental
to hit the boundary generates the two-regime shape, since even in a marginal framework the
central bank will intervene already when at a distance to the bands. Furthermore, this is the
case in which de facto bands start to appear. Finally, we present a case in which β is large
enough (β = 50) to trigger the regime shift, and the band in fact ceases to exist: the tendency
to escape brings the fundamental process to constantly surpass the boundary, honeymoon effects
are impossible and pure reflection intervention concentrates most of the realizations around the
initial level. This, as N → ∞, generates a Dirac delta function around the initial value of the
fundamental. This is shown in Figure 10.
Figure 8 Exchange rate densities, β = 0
(a) Marginal intervention, LAW (b) Intramarginal intervention, pure reflection
Figure 9 Exchange rate densities, β > 0, β < βe
(a) Intramarginal intervention, LAW (b) Two-regime intervention, pure reflection
7 Sources of risk
Let us now explore the implications of our characterization of fundamental risk. Up to now we
have chosen to keep β as purely a parameter of increasing risk, which controls the probability
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Figure 10 Exchange rate densities, β > βe,
Ballistic regime dominates and target band too narrow given the level of risk.
spread and hence the tails of the fundamental distribution. What we want to achieve in this
section is to connect this parameter to specific economic mechanisms which may drive the
determination of exchange rate dynamics. Rey (2015) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2019) study the
role of the global financial cycle in exchange rate arrangements. According to these developments,
the trilemma configuration of monetary policy, exchange rate regime and capital mobility is
determined by country-specific risk and is affected by global risk aversion. One of the key
assumptions of the literature is the fulfillment of the no-arbitrage condition, usually modeled by
UIP. However, a vast empirical literature shows that UIP does not hold. Such deviations from
the UIP conditions are shown to be correlated with risk:
E
(
dXt
dt
)
= g(i∗t − it) + η,
where g is a weakly increasing function, generally taking small values, i∗ is the anchor country
interest rate and η is the UIP deviation. From the financial crisis literature - see for example
Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2019) and Avdjiev et al. (2019) - this deviation is shown to be
directly determined by
η = i∗ + γ,
where γ is country-specific risk. The literature largely ignores this fact, given the modeling
choices in the fundamental process which tend to model risk only indirectly, either via realign-
ment risk or by adding jumps to the process. One potential interpretation of the parameter of
increasing risk β is to account for the extra risk stemming from the failure of the arbitrage con-
dition and for country-specific risk. It is clear that as country risk increases, it is more difficult
for the country fundamental to converge to the target fundamental.
Another possible interpretation of β is by exploring the other source of UIP deviations: capital
flows. It is well-known that capital flows are procyclical with global risk aversion, and therefore
affecting the magnitude of the deviation. To give a stylized description, consider the fundamental
process of the exchange rate as defined by
ft = mt + vt
where mt is the money supply and a general stochastic process v(t) which is a composite money
demand shock (“velocity”). Usually money supply is assumed constant: in our case, however, we
include the potential of domestic money supply being affected by exogenous foreign money supply
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shocks, as proxied by incoming capital flows. Note that this source of risk cannot be modeled by
adding more Gaussian noise, or by modulating the variance (see Appendix C for an illustration
of this fact). We assume here that the central bank is using unsterilized intervention to lean
against the direction of capital flows. This also implies that the only channel of adjustment is
the interest rate differential: this is in line with Lai et al. (2008), who show that the relationship
between the interest rate differential and exchange rate dynamics can have a correlation structure
that is not necessarily negative. For open economies, the magnitude by which domestic money
supply is affected by foreign fundamentals is determined by the measure of capital mobility
allowed by the home country. Let us therefore define the deviation from UIP parity as
∆UIPt(β) = β
(
it − i∗t − E
Xt
dt
)
, (15)
where β is a measure of capital mobility, i the domestic interest rate and i∗ is the reference rate.
Note that when β = 0 this deviation is zero by construction, and when β is very high UIP needs
to hold because of the high degree of capital flows which implies a fast convergence of the interest
rate differential. Note also that in both of these cases we revert to the Krugman case if one
allows constant infinitesimal marginal intervention. If (15) is nonzero, using the fundamental
exchange rate equation one immediately obtains that the exchange rate X is determined by its
fundamental equation plus an amount proportional to the deviation, i.e.
Xt = rft +
(1− r)
α
E
{
dXt
dt
}
+ g(∆UIPt(β))
where g(.) is a general nondecreasing function (scaled by r). In a target zone setting, if the
domestic money supply mt is not constant and subject to exogenous shocks given by capital
flows, then monetary authorities have to react in such a way as to counteract exchange market
pressures created by the capital flows themselves in order to maintain the zone. The mean of
this deviation in a target zone, therefore, should be zero. Since the variation of this deviation
is always non-zero, we are therefore augmenting the fundamental process by means of a mean-
preserving spread, calibrated by the degree of capital mobility β.
We can therefore also connect the threshold βe at which the regime shift occurs to complete
factor market integration: for lower levels of β, the home fundamental exhibits an idiosyncratic
component anchored to its original dynamics that is stronger than its tendency to converge to
the target fundamental. Once this component is overcome, the target zone ceases to exist and
the currency starts floating. This also may help explaining why countries with a high level of
capital integration with the target currency may have higher costs in maintaining a target zone.
One implication of the suddenness of the regime shift is that the relationship between capital
integration and the duration of the target zone is non-monotonic. This is precisely what Lera
and Sornette (2015) illustrate with the case of the Swiss Franc floor between 2011-2015.
7.1 Policy implications and potential contributions
A target zone with a terminal exit time to another currency has two objectives. First, the central
bank wants to limit the volatility of the its exchange rate (Xt) versus the anchor currency below
the free float level of the anchor currency (Zt). This provides us a natural limiting condition to
the size of the band that the central bank can set.
|f | ≤ σz
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This essentially means that the band size of ERM-II of ±15% will never be breached if the
central bank of the target zone currency pegs to the Euro, as the Euro itself has a annualised
volatility versus other major currencies in the range of 7-10%. Second, the central bank needs
its target-zone to be considered credible, to enjoy “honeymoon effects”, which in turns reduces
the cost of intervention for achieveing the set parity. In our setup, we uncover the concept of
a characteristic relaxation time τrelax which determines the minimum time a target zone must
be maintained to “feel” the first effects of the home central bank’s actions aimed at reducing
fluctuations of the exchange rate, compared to a free float.9 This allows us to interpret τrelax
as the minimum time for agents for update their previously held exchange rate expectations,
generating self-fulfilling expectations that create the honeymoon effect.
This does not mean that a central bank can’t adopt a target currency overnight with an arbitrary
parity being the close of day value of the target exchange rate. In such a case, agents would not
have had time to update their expectations and this would force the central bank to use a larger
proportion of its assets (in the target currency) defending the parity level. This opens up many
different avenues of enquiry into the expectation generation process of agents in foreign exchange
markets. If trelax as the minimum time for agents for update their previously held exchange rate
expectations, this means that a higher degree of agent risk aversion will reduce trelax. As shown
by Osler (1995), this effect would work through the credibility of the target zone in time shifting
speculators’ horizons towards towards short term speculation, where tspeculation ≤ trelax. This
is a natural outcome of “honeymoon effects” which make intervention cheaper for central banks
and harder for speculators after trelax.
We find that trelax is increasing in riskiness of the fundamental process for β ≤ βe. Moreover,
the target band size is also increasing in riskiness of the fundamental process for β ≤ βe up
to|f | ≤ σz.
A potential relevance of our framework may have emerged in a recent development for the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS is planning to replace the
current West African CFA Franc with a common currency, named Eco. The goal is for the 15
states to transition to the Eco via a target zone mechanism, similar to the ERM-II. Currently
the CFA Franc is pegged to the Euro, with operational management shared between the Bank
of France and the local central banks. After the reform, these countries would have to manage
their own exchange rate targets without any outside support. The main economic and reasons
are understandable, and lie primarily in boosting cross-border trade and economic development
in the African sub-region, and in the severing of the ties with the former colonial ruler, France.
One of the main concerns is the short time horizon proposed for the target zone mechanism
(one year). Moreover, there may be additional risk stemming from not allowing the ECB to
have operational risk-sharing in the process, as well as the inherent risk faced by individual
West African central banks. This translates directly to our framework, where the risk factor β
may generate a relaxation time trelax for individual states that may be larger than the proposed
convergence time T . This could potentially have devastating consequences on the credibility
of the partecipating central banks, and of the overall process of creation of the new common
currency. The inability of some ECOWAS countries to achieve the convergence criteria would
make the adoption of ECO impossible in the near future.
9The bank’s actions may be then viewed as a de facto reduction of the target zone band over time, whilst the
de jure band remains unchanged.
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8 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the implications of extending exchange rate target zone modeling
to non-stationary dynamics and a more rigorous definition of risk. Our framework leads to a
natural interpretation of target zone credibility, driven by the interplay between two contrasting
forces: a destabilizing ballistic effect driven by risk which pushes the exchange rate towards the
bands, and a stabilizing diffusive force.
Our model does not deal with optimal choices: indeed, the only choice variable potentially
available to the authorities is the time horizon T by when the required parity needs to obtain.
As such, from the policy perspective our model poses what is essentially a screening problem
in the informational sense: in a worst case scenario, it is likely that neither of the two central
banks knows the true riskiness of the fundamental process. If one chooses an exit time which is
lower than the required minimum time at which parity can be reached (the relaxation time), the
target zone exit time is not credible. However, setting a T which is too high exposes onme to
increased business cycle risks, the dampening of which were a likely reason for entering a target
zone in the first place. We show how our model effectively endogenizes the presence of the
bands by the exchange rate expectations, and how the interplay between risk and target band
has key implications in the credibility of the zone itself, as well as the possibility of honeymoon
effects. Intervention is shown to be both marginal and intramarginal, depending on how much
the central bank “hears” the distance to the target zone band. The potential emergence of regime
shifts, furthermore, can further erode the target zone credibility, and would prompt the central
bank to either intervene This allows the methods employed in this paper to be applied to a
wide range of situations. An important future contribution of our work would be the structural
estimation of the model parameters and an explicit computation of the relaxation time, thus
effectively providing a lower bound for the necessary time for a country to reach the desired
parity.
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Appendices
A Derivations of the stationary and transient equations
For the derivation of the stationary solution, we first introduce the following integral transformation:
X(t, f) =
∫ f
cosh(βζ)Y (t, ζ)dζ ⇐⇒ ∂fX(t, f) = cosh(βf)Y (t, f), (16)
which is Darboux-type functional transformation. Eq.(4) therefore leads to:
∂tY (t, f) +
σ2
2
∂ffY (t, f)−
[
β2
2
+
α
(1− r)
]
Y (t, f) = − rα
(1− r)f cosh(βf). (17)
Setting ∂t = 0 one obtains a nonlinear ODE in f which has the closed form solution as given by (7),
which is the sum of the general solution (two opposite-sided exponentials) and a particular solution.
Inverting the transformation back to X one obtains (6).
For the transient dynamics, we need to solve the following equation:
 ∂τX(τ, f)−
σ2
2 ∂ffX(τ, f)− β tanh(βf)∂fX(τ, f) + α(1−r)X(τ, f) = + rα(1−r)f,
X(0, f) = 0.
(18)
Writing X(τ, f) = X∗(τ, f) +XS(f), Eq.(18) implies:

−σ22 ∂ffXS(f)− β tanh(βf)∂fXS(f) + α(1−r)XS(f) = + rα(1−r)f,
∂τX
∗(τ, f)− σ22 ∂ffX∗(τ, f)− β tanh(βf)∂fX∗(τ, (f) + α(1−r)X∗(τ, f) = 0.
(19)
While the first line in Eq.(19) has already being solved in Eq.(6), the second line needs now to be
discussed. Writing again X∗(τ, f) cosh(βf) := Y ∗(τ, f), we obtain:
∂τY
∗(τ, f)− σ
2
2
∂ffY
∗(τ, f) +
[
β2
2
+
α
(1− r)
]
Y ∗(τ, f) = 0. (20)
The smooth-pasting conditions given by Eq.(8) imposes:

∂fX
∗(τ, f) |f=f= 0 ⇒ {[∂fY ∗(τ, f)]− β tanh(βf)Y ∗(τ, f)} |f=f= 0,
∂fX
∗(τ, f) |f=f= 0 ⇒ {[∂fY ∗(τ, f)]− β tanh(βf)Y ∗(τ, f)} |f=f= 0.
(21)
We solve (20) by separation of variables and expansion over the basis of a complete set of orthogonal
eigenfunctions. The solution can be expressed as Y ∗(τ, f) = φ(τ)ψ(f), and therefore we can write it as
φ˙(τ)
φ(τ)
= λk =
σ2
2
ψ′′(f)
ψ(f)
− ρ
where ρ =
[
β2
2 +
α
(1−r)
]
.
The time-dependent part solves to ψ(τ) = exp(τλk), and the fundamental-dependent part can be written
as
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ψ′′(f)− 2(λk + ρ)ψ(f) = ψ′′(f) + 2Ω
2
k
σ2
ψ(f) = 0.
The rest of the derivations follow straightforwardly, solving for ψ and obtaining the eigenfunctions
ψk(f) = c1 cos
(√
2
Ωk
σ
ft
)
+ c2 sin
(√
2
Ωk
σ
ft
)
.
which form an orthogonal basis for the space of 2f¯ well-behaving functions. Smooth-pasting conditions
impose c1 = 0, c2 = 1 and we obtain the form of the eigenfunctions as given by (11). The Fourier
coefficients follow in their standard form, using the stationary equation XS(ft).
B Risk, regime shifts and honeymoon effects
We now briefly discuss the connection between risk and honeymoon effect, and how such effects cannot
be be obtained when the ballistic tendency of the fundamental is too large. For illustrative purposes, let
us consider a baseline case of our model with r = 1/2 in a symmetric band [−f, f ] around the parity 0,
and let us compare the DMPS-driven model with the standard Gaussian one. Omitting time dependency,
we have again the framework given by
X = f +
1
α
E {dX}
dt
,
which leads to the following couple of PDEs, depending on the form of the fundamental process.{
X = f + 12∂ff [X(f)] (Gaussian),
X = f + 12∂ff [X(f)] + β tanh(βf)∂f [X(f)] (DMPS).
We now focus on the stationary regime for which get the general solutions:{
X(f) = f +A0 sinh(ρ0f), (Gaussian),
X(f) = f +Aβ
sinh(ρβf)
cosh(βf) , (DMPS),
where ρβ =
√
β2 + 4α and Aβ is a yet undetermined amplitude. We now apply the smooth fitting
procedure at the target level +f¯10. Accordingly we have:
{
X(F ) := Xˆ = F +A0 sinh(ρ0F ), (fittting at level F ),
0 = 1 +A0ρ0 cosh(ρ0F ) (smooth fittting),
Accordingly we have:
Xˆ = f − sinh(ρ0f)
ρ0 cosh(ρ0f)
→ Xˆ > f.
The fact that Xˆ > f is a direct consequence of the honeymoon effect.
We now show how our characterization of risk changes radically the above framework. We perform the
smooth fitting for the DMPS process and obtain:

X(f) := Xˆ = f +Aβ
sinh(ρβf)
cosh(βf)
, (fittting at level f),
0 = 1 +
Aβ
cosh2(βf)
[
ρβcosh(ρβf) cosh(βf)− β sinh(βf)
]
(smooth fittting).
10Due to the symmetry, we have here only one amplitudeA to determine since only one boundary needs to be
considered.
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Accordingly, we now obtain:
Xˆ = f − cosh(βf) sinh(ρ0f)
ρβ cosh(βf) cosh(ρ0f)− β sinh(βf) sinh(ρβF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
A(β)
.
Now we have to distinguish between two regimes. i) A(β) < 0 and conversely ii) A(β) > 0. The transition
between these two regimes occurs when A(β) = 0, that is to say:
ρβ cotanh(ρβf) = β tanh(βf). (22)
Now we observe that the singularity observed in Eq.(22) coincides with Eq.(11) which in our manuscript
precisely determines the lowest eigenvalue of the spectrum. In other words, for β large enough, the
smooth-fitting procedure cannot be applied, and hence it exists a critical risk level βe for which the
honeymoon effect cannot possibly apply.
C Noise sources driving the fundamental
Let us now assume that the fundamental is driven by a couple of noise sources, namely i) composite
shocks vt and ii) fluctuations in the money supply mt, given by Gaussian noise around a drift µ. We
therefore add another source of noise, but we are not necessarily increasing the risk in the fundamental
process. We then have
 dft = σ1dW1,t + dmt,
dmt = µdt+ σ2dW2,t, mt=0 = m0.
(23)
where the noise sources dW1,t and dW2,t are two independent White Gaussian Noise (WGN) processes.
We then obtain ft as a Gaussian process, since trivially
dft = µdt+
√
σ21 + σ
2
2dWt
and we are exactly in the standard framework (in the literature usually µ = 0), only with a change in
variance. If however we wish to incorporate a general increase in risk, and one that may represent the
repulsive force that was discussed in Section 2, we can write the following more general framework:
 dft = σ1dW1,t + dmt,
dzβ,t = ζ(β; zt)dt+ σ2(β)dW2,t, zt=0 = 0.
where β ≥ 0 is a control parameter and the repulsive drift ζ(β; z) = −ζ(β;−z) < 0 models an extra risk
source via a dynamic zero mean process. We parametrize risk with β, and therefore β = 0 simply implies
σ2(β) = ζ(0; zt) = 0 implying that the process is Gaussian and driven entirely by the composite shock
process. Our candidate for ζ is the DMPS process:
dft = σ1dW1,t + dzt = β tanh(βzt)dt+ σ1dW1,t + σ2(β)dW2,t
⇓
dzt = β tanh(βzt)dt+
[√
σ21 + σ
2
2(β)
]
dWt, zt=0 = 0.
where we used the fact that the difference between two independent WGN’s is again a WGN with variance
as given in the previous equation. Alternatively one may formally write:
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dft = σ1dW1,t + β tanh
β zt︷ ︸︸ ︷(ft − σ1W1,t)
 dt+ σ2(β)dW2,t =
β tanh
β zt︷ ︸︸ ︷(ft − σ1W1,t)
 dt+ [√σ21 + σ22(β)] dWt,
Using the initial equation (1) and the previous equation and applying Itô’s lemma to the functional
X(ft, t), we obtain:
(1−r)
α
∂tX(f, t) + ∂fX(f, t)E {β tanh [β(ft − σ1W1,t]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
=β tanh[β(f)]
+
[
σ21 + σ
2
2(β)
]
∂ffX(f, t)
 =
Xt − r ft
(24)
In the last Eq.(24), the under-brace equality follows since all odd moments in the expansion of the
hyperbolic tangent vanish and the tanh(x) is itself an odd function. Now, normalizing as to have[
σ21 + σ
2
2(β)
]
= 1, we are in the nominal setting of our paper.
D Attracting drift: mean-reverting dynamics
A fully similar discussion can be done for mean-reverting fundamental dynamics (Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
dynamics) reflected inside an interval [f, f ]. In this section, the fundamental is driven by the mean-
reverting dynamics:
df = θ(µ− f)dt+ σdWt,
where µ is the “long-run” level of the fundamental, and θ is the speed of convergence. Following the
previous exposition, we can obtain the full solution for the exchange rate X∗(t, f) as the solution of
∂tX +
σ2
2
∂ffX + θ(µ− f)∂fX − α
1− rX = −
rα
1− r f.
As before, we have the stationary solution for a vanishing ∂t, and here it reads
XS(f) = A 1F1
[
α
2θ(1− r) ,
1
2
;
θ
σ2
(f − µ)2
]
+
+ B
√
θ
σ
(f − µ) 1F1
[
α
2θ(1− r) +
1
2
,
3
2
;
θ
σ2
(f − µ)2
]
+
+
[
θµ(1− r)f + rα
θ(1− r) + α
]
(25)
where 1F1[a, b;x] is the confluent hypergeometric function. The integration constants A and B, as before,
are determined via smooth pasting at the target zone boundaries, namely: ∂XS(f)|f=f = ∂XS(f)|f=f¯ =
0. Note that if µ = 0, then A = 0. Figure 11 shows the stationary dynamics of the exchange rate as
function of the fundamental, for different values of long-run level µ and noise variance σ. The band is
assumed symmetric around 0, and f¯ = 10%.
The associated Sturm-Liouville equation is now given by
σ2
2
∂ffX + θ(µ− f)∂fX + ρX = 0,
where ρ = α1−r , and the spectrum of the process can be obtained explicitly by solving a transcendental
equation involving Weber parabolic cylinder functions. As before, the complete solution is given by an
expansion on a complete set of orthogonal functions on the target band, namely:
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Figure 11 Mean-Reverting Stationary Dynamics
X∗(T − t, f) = XS(f) +
∞∑
k=1
ck exp[−(Ωk + ρ)(T − t)]ψ(Ωk, f),
where the Fourier coefficients ck again impose the terminal condition X∗(0, f) = −XS(f). As worked
out by Linetsky (2005) explicit though lengthy closed form expressions are obtainable (see Eqs.(39) and
(40). For the case of a symmetric target zone f = −f , an approximation valid for large eigenvalues Ωk,
(i.e. large k’s) is given in [L] and reads:
Ωk =
k2piσ2
8f
2 +
θ
2
+ c0 +O
(
1
k2
)
c0 =
θ2
6σ2
(4f¯2 − 6f¯µ+ 3µ2). (26)
The normalised eigenfunctions, also up to O
(
1
k2
)
, read:
ψk(f) = ± σ√
2
f¯−1/2 exp
[
θ(f − µ)2
2σ2
] [
cos
(
kpif
2f¯
)
+
2f¯
kpiσ2
φ(f) sin
(
kpif
2f¯
)]
φ(f) =
θ2
6σ2
f3 − θ
2µ
2σ2
f2 −
[
θ
2
(√
2θ
σ
µ+ 1 + c0
)]
f + θµ (27)
While strictly speaking Eq.(26) furnishes very good estimates for large k values, a closer look in [L] shows
that even for low k’s, (k = 1, 2, · · · ), pretty good approximations are also obtainable. In particular, for
k = 1, we approximately have:
τrelax ' [Ω1]−1 =
[
piσ2
8f
2 +
θ
2
+ c0
]−1
.
For this mean-reverting dynamics, the interplay between risk (here solely due to the noise source variance
σ2) and the target band width 2f on trelax is opposite compared to the DMPS dynamics of section 2.
The tendency of the fundamental f to revert to its long-run level µ, for a narrow target band, generates
an effect of an increase in risk (variance) that is opposite of the one generated by an increase of β in the
DMPS setting, because of the latter’s tendency to escape from the mean. If the band is larger, lower
levels of σ initially increase the relaxation time, to ultimately achieving a decreasing effect. In both
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cases, an increase in the size of the target band requires a higher T in order for the target zone to be
credible.
We lastly notice that for the O-U case, zero is always the first eigenvalue (not surprising, given that it’s
an ergodic process) and a regime shift cannot be possible.
E Alternative to O-U dynamics: softly attractive drift
We now present the model where we model the fundamental as an ergodic process with a softly attractive
drift instead of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics. This framework has the advantage of incorporating
mean-reverting dynamics while retaining analytical tractability. By “softly attractive” drift we mean the
DMPS drift with opposite sign, i.e. −β tanh(βf). This model presents similar dynamics to the O-U
framework, and allows for a stationary time-independent probability measure. The marginal difference
with the O-U advantage is that the reversion of the fundamental to the mean is softer, and the advantage
is that the full spectrum is available and the dynamics do not require an approximation. The equation
for the exchange rate after applying Itô’s lemma is now given by
∂tX(t, f) +
1
2
∂ffX(t, f)− β tanh(βf)∂fX(t, f)− α
(1− r)X(t, f) = −
rα
(1− r)f. (28)
Using the equivalent transformation as in the DMPS case, we plug in Eq.(28) into Eq.(16) and obtain:
∫ f
cosh(βζ)∂tY (t, ζ)+
1
2 [β sinh(βf)Y (t, f) + cosh(βf)∂fY (t, f)]−
β sinh(βf)Y (t, f)− α(1−r)
∫ f
cosh(βζ)Y (t, ζ)dζ = − rα(1−r)f.
(29)
Now, taking once more the derivative of Eq.(29) with respect to f , one obtains:
∂tY (t, f) +
1
2
∂ffY (t, f)−
[
β2
2
+
α
1− r
]
Y (t, f) = − rα
(1− r)
f
cosh(βf)
. (30)
Observe now that Eq.(30) is once again equivalent to the standard BM motion case and we can repeat the
same procedure we . The spectrum will now include the eigenvalue zero since we deal with a stationary
case.
We now proceed as before and Eq.(30) reads:
− ∂τY (τ, f) + 1
2
∂ffY (τ, f)−
[
β2
2
+
α
1− r
]
Y (τ, f) = − rα
(1− r)
f
cosh(βf)
. (31)
Consider now the homogenous part of Eq.(31), namely:
−∂τY (τ, f) + 1
2
∂ffY (τ, f)−
[
β2
2
+
α
1− r
]
Y (τ, f) = 0.
As done before, the method of separation of variables leads us to introduce Y (τ, f) = φ(τ)ψ(f) and the
previous equation can be rewritten as:
−∂τψ(τ)
ψ(τ)
+
1
2
∂ffψ(f)
ψ(f)
−
[
β2
2
+
α
1− r
]
= 0.
and therefore we can write:
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
−∂τψ(τ)
ψ(τ) = λk,
1
2
∂ffψ(f)
ψ(f) −
[
β2
2 +
α
1−r
]
= λk
Defining Ω2k =
[
β2
2 +
α
1−r
]
+ λk, the relevant eigenfunctions reads:
ψ(f) = c1 sin(
√
2Ωkf) + c2 cos(
√
2Ωkf).
Going back to Eq.(16), the boundary conditions at the borders of the target zone f = −f reads:
∂f
[∫ f
cosh(βζ)ψ(ζ)dζ
]
|f=f = 0.
which implies that:
cosh(βf)ψ(f) ⇒ c1 = 0 and Ωk = (2k + 1) pi
2
√
2 f
. (32)
We note that Eq.(32) implies :
λk =
(2k + 1)2pi2
8f
2 −
β2
2
− α
1− r ≥ 0. (33)
Lastly, as expected, for the soft attractive case we are able to derive the exact spectrum analytically and
unlike the DMPS case, there is no spectral gap.
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